11:59A Train 351 reports missing the switch to go in the center track at Mt. Vernon Sq (center track was out of service) – ROCC informed the operator to continue to U St and reverse which the operator acknowledged
12:04P Train 351 departs U St towards Columbia Heights
12:06P Train 351 contacts the ROCC from Columbia Heights to ask where they are turning around, ROCC tells the operator to continue to Georgia Av to turn around and reiterates the previous instructions
10:50A Track Inspectors identified defective heel block bolt on switch 5A on the outbound track (E1 34+50)
10:58A Speed restrictions implemented from 🟡🟢 Mt Vernon Sq > 🟡🟢 Shaw-Howard Univ and Mt. Vernon Sq trains (35X) instructed to turn around at U St.
11:55A Emergency Response Team arrives at Mt. Vernon Sq.
12:12P Third Rail fails to de-energize on the center track (Track 3)
12:22P Mt. Vernon Sq trains (35X) instructed to turn around at 🟡🟢 Georgia Av
12:33P Emergency Response Team begins work
12:35P Emergency Response Team completes work and removes speed restriction
9:40P Problem reported at Gallery Place
9:47PM Train offloaded at Mt. Vernon Sq
7:53P Individual Struck by Train 509 entering Shaw-Howard Univ station
7:55P Metro begins single tracking operations at Shaw
8:20P Individual rescued and transports with critical injuries
9:53P Incident Train moved to Greenbelt Rail Yard
10:41P Single tracking concluded
At 10:17A a track inspector suffered an injury to their right ankle requiring DC Fire & EMS response, while walking ~1,500’ (E1 243.00) from the inbound end of the 🟢🟡 Ft Totten platform on the outbound track requiring 🟢🟡 Greenbelt trains to single track via the inbound track at Georgia Av & Ft. Totten until 11:15AM when the injured employee was removed from the train and placed in the care of EMS at Ft. Totten
• At 10:43A Incident commander denied permission for DC Fire to enter track bed
• At 10:43A Apparently neither the DC Fire or the on scene commander briefly has access to the lock for the EETC cart cabinet
• At 10:54 the ROCC announced a train would be sent (Train 303 was offloaded at Columbia Heights) to pick up the injured employee – during this communication there was radio issues between the ROCC & On Scene Commander
• ROCC never implemented SOP 1A initiating emergency procedures and did not require other routine track crews to clear the roadway within its territory
About Us: Rail Transit OPS Group provides independent monitoring and transparency of rail transit operations as part of its dual mission: monitor and evaluate rail transit operators’ adherence to these processes, and provide additional information during service disruptions. Rail Transit OPS Group business operations are solely funded by individual contributions from the public. To make a contribution visit our Support Page You can find us on Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter at @RailTransitOPS.